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REVISITING THE NOTION OF ‘ANALYSIS’ 
ON THE BEDROCK OF ANALYTIC 
PHILOSOPHY 
Sanjit Chakraborty* 
On ‘Taking Sides in Philosophy’ (1937), Ryle opposes all sorts 
of ‘ism’ in philosophy. His ostensible revulsion attempts to see 
philosophy not as so-called party issues that depend on non-
philosophical prejudices. He thinks that two extremely 
different philosophical schools that have no agreement on their 
foundational claims sound unconvinced. During the period of 
the Second World War, the world not only bigoted two 
belligerent rivals; but regretfully philosophers (including Ryle 
himself) unsavourily engaged themselves to demarcate an 
edging line between the analytic and the continental. This 
division was portrayed from a historical, cultural, and 
geographical background and it strengthened the division 
between analytic and continental from the prospect of 
‘methodology’. The supporters show the clue from history of 
philosophy by bringing the contrast such as Eastern versus 
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Western, Ancient versus Medieval versus Modern, Kantian 
versus Neo-Kantian and so on. Similarly, the division and the 
origin of analytic philosophy need to be considered as a hyped 
stage in the history of philosophy. 
 Philosophers, the question-minded beings in all eras, 
doubtlessly engage themselves in the quest of reasoning in the 
formulation of thoughts. A thinker guided by clarification, 
reason, impartiality, reflective thoughts, integrity and desire, 
and who assimilates new perspectives can be regarded as a 
philosopher. In his On What Matters (2011) Derek Parfit 
writes: “After learning from the works of great philosophers, 
we should try to make some more progress. By standing on the 
shoulders of giants, we may be able to see further than they 
could.” (p. 300) Therefore, one can query that the distinctive 
qualities are that what makes analytic philosophy promising 
and exclusive. The systematic inquiry raises qualm on the way 
that voids Anglo-American (analytic philosophy) with the 
continental (mainland Europe like Italy, France and Germany) 
one.  
 I think that analytic philosophy is a method of systematic 
thought that underpins the formation of language by eliminating 
the classical metaphysical system. It seems true that clarity and 
especially ‘analysis’ are the well-accepted equipments that 
analytic philosophers promoted. However, it seems to me that 
continental philosophy, mainly in German tradition, finds the 
prominent ideas of ‘phenomenological analysis’ in Edmund 
Husserl’s thought and ‘Ontological analysis’ in Martin 
Heidegger’s writings correspondingly. 
 The specific feature of analytic philosophy intends to carry 
on a philosophical investigation from a subjective level. 
Various types of ‘analyses’ may rule over in philosophy at 
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different time periods like scientific analysis in the period of 
logical positivism, logical analysis in the trend of Frege-
Russell, and  decompositional analysis in Moore’s hand. 
Analytic philosophy, just a hundred-year young philosophical 
trend, gets its standby introducing the first methodological 
approach that edifice language as a prime soul of philosophy. 
Analytic philosophers try to understand the ‘linguistic 
representation’ of the world from the ground of semantic 
(meaning) and reference. Another Copernican revolution that 
analytic philosophy persuades depends on the root of ‘linguistic 
turn,’ a turn that stresses on language to understand the world 
and the mind. Concentrating on mind and world one should see 
through language. 
 Frege, the father of analytic philosophy, concedes that the 
linguistic expressions have sense and reference together. The 
singular terms assign their reference by means of sense. The 
rudimentary approach that Frege appealed for analytic 
development is based on logical analysis that later goes toward 
semantic analysis. I think that “Frege has distinguished between 
the study of word-world relations (theory of reference) and the 
study of word-meaning relations (theory of sense). However, he 
wants to see them as working together in a fully integrated 
theory of language.” (Chakraborty, 2016, p. 11) 
In ‘On Denoting’ Russell endures with the difficulty of 
meaning and reference taking into consideration Frege’s stand 
on sense or reference, but apparently in a diverse way. Russell 
introduces the method of ‘theory of descriptions’ that Ramsey 
often called a “paradigm case of philosophy”. Russell’s 
criterion that relies on logical analysis sets out a distinction 
between names and definite description. Russell aims to rebuff 
the decomposition method of Moore by bringing the idea of 
logical analysis.. An example of Russell’s logical analysis is:  
The present king of France is bald. 
There is only one king of France, and whatever is king 
of France is bald. 
In the case of analyzing the definite description, the 
concept of ‘discompositionality’ that Moore puts forward 
becomes inferior. For Russell, knowing an object means 
knowing only the description of the properties of the particular 
object. In the referred sentence ‘the present king of France is 
bald,’ here the whole sentence turns out to be meaningless 
because of the lack of meaning cum reference of the term 
‘present king of France’. Russellian singular terms construe the 
co-existence of the sense and referent. A genuine referring 
expression has some descriptive properties that relate to the 
referent, while pseudo or mock referring term lacks reference 
and it turns out meaningless. Undoubtedly, meaning takes a 
pertinent role in analytic philosophy. Simon Blackburn 
considers that the decisive facet of analytic philosophy stands 
on the groundwork of clarification and reference fixation 
(referent). Blackburn remarks: “A demonstrative needs a 
context to give it a reference: it can refer to different things on 
different occasions, and a competent user of the language will 
know this.” (1984, p. 303) 
Wittgenstein, leading Cambridge analytic thinker, notices 
the pitfall of logical analysis and brings up the conception of 
conceptual analysis, as he considers that logically, independent 
elementary proposition remains unsteady. Analysis seems to 
him a brand that composes of presupposition, exclusion and 
implication. Ordinary language is beyond the calculus rules of 
logic and mathematics. Later Wittgenstein does not believe in 
the one to one relationship between words and objects. 
Wittgenstein’s points emphasize ‘everything lies open to view’. 
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Therefore, his first challenge is that what language analysis 
attains is the conceptual variation of the logical structure of 
language, while another challenge goes toward the concepts of 
the world that is described by the contents of language.    
 Most philosophers consider that analytic philosophy in the 
Anglo-American field is more expanded in the hand of 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein structures language not as an 
expression of reality, but as a human practice or use, it is 
embedded in the ‘form of life’. Wittgenstein says: “Language-
games are the forms of language with which a child begins to 
make use of words. The study of language-games is the study 
of primitive forms of language or primitive language.” (1958, 
p. 17) 
Wittgenstein looks at meaning as use and explanation. 
Early Wittgenstein ponders the logical structure of ‘picture 
theory’ of language, but later, in Philosophical Investigations, 
he changed his mind by believing that language is a form of 
life and we participate in a game with language. Language in 
Wittgenstein’s sense speaks about the world. 
 From 1930-1950, analytic philosophy was in deep 
influence of the logical positivists whom we called Vienna 
circle. They abet philosophy in two distinct approaches - 
logical and conceptual (influenced by Wittgenstein). For them, 
the task of philosophy is to analyse the logical structure of 
language preserved by the conceptual scheme that lies behind 
it. Their visions were to unify science, use scientific knowledge 
in philosophy and introduce artificial language by promoting 
logic and mathematics. Empiricist credo on sensory evidence 
and natural science based justification, logical positivists not 
only applied in beliefs, but to language. A positivist refutes the 
genre of metaphysics and standoff the notion of verifiability 
hypothesis. These sorts of prospects talks about the second 
methodology of analytic philosophy that is familiar with the 
name of ‘scientific spirit’ in W.V Quine’s sense. Early Quine 
was highly impressed by the logical positivists’ thoughts. 
However, in 1951, the last nail Quine (1953, pp. 20-46) 
dragged in the coffin of logical positivism by arguing against 
the logical positivists’ two foundational claims – the distinction 
between analytic and synthetic propositions and the conception 
of the reductive analysis.  Actually, positivists believe in the 
procedure of meaning fixation of a confirming experience 
based statement from the aspect of ‘stipulation’. The 
statements relating a priori truths are based on the stipulation 
or convention. So, analytic statements that are dependent on 
confirming experience become true just because of meaning 
alone. Quine mainly alludes and later refutes analyticity and a 
priority in the sense of truth by convention.  
 
Here one thing needs to be clarified is that ‘analytic truth’ 
that Quine purports to reject has a universal range of 
confirming experiences which relates to the concept of no 
matter what, a notion of a priority. It becomes redundant from 
the history of science, because there is no legitimate principle 
of science that believes in such a claim. The impetus that 
inspired Quine is undoubtedly the ‘scientific spirit,’ a second 
methodology of analytic philosophy, as I understand. In 
Mysticism and Logic (1925, p. 37), Russell stresses on the 
scientific philosophy. Quine most probably is the first 
philosopher who induces naturalism in epistemology by 
leaving out Aristotelian First Philosophy as vague and 
eloquently initiates a stance in favour of the scientific pursuit of 
truth. It seems clear to me that Quine’s intention do not impose 
scientific burden on philosophy. However, his purpose was to 
eliminate dogmatic jargons from philosophy. Quine’s 
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‘scientific spirit’ outlines philosophy from the colours of 
evidential checkpoint, observation, naturalism, web of beliefs, 
holism, inter-subjectivity etc. Quine concedes meaning as a 
second grade notion and accepts the concept of ‘stimulus 
meaning’ for the cause of ‘inter-subjective’ communication in 
native language. Quine spells out later: “To learn a language is 
to learn the meaning of its sentences, and hence to learn what 
observations to count as evidence for and against them. The 
evidence relation and the semantical relation of observation to 
theory are co-extensive.” (1974, p. 38)   
It sounds clear from the previous discussion that analysis, 
clarification and meaning, three major aspects allied to 
language, makes a good sense in analytic philosophy.  J. L 
Austin, famous Oxford philosopher, originates a piecemeal 
procedure that Hilary Putnam and Quine refutes by introducing 
a holistic approach of the meaning of the sentence. Putnam 
considers that ‘meanings’ aren’t objects. The dictionary 
meaning of a word can give us information, but that 
information does not determine the truth-evaluable content of a 
sentence in a context. He accepts that what sentences mean 
always depends on the connections to the world, and even in 
the case of logical or analytic sentences, the same rules are 
followed. That is not because of some supposed grand theses of 
‘meaning holism,’ but because of the collapse of the 
unrelativized a priori. Putnam also strongly believes that the 
meaning of a single predicate depends on the entire socio-
linguistic practices and the practices are related to the entire 
language, this thesis is regarded as semantic holism. 
 In Origins of Analytical Philosophy (1994), Michael 
Dummett significantly points out that the analysis of thought 
and language strictly escorts a differentiation between analytic 
and continental philosophy. One very interesting point that 
Ryle along with some continental philosophers raised against 
analytic philosophy is the disease of using havoc ‘foot-and-end 
notes’. Hans Glock writes: 
Indeed, Dummett published his aforementioned tome about 
Frege initially not just without footnotes, but also without a 
single quotation or reference. Once more, however, there is 
no absolute and pervasive contrast here between analytic 
philosophers and their non-analytic colleagues. When they 
write on historical issues, for example, analytic philosophers 
employ footnotes just as liberally as traditionalist 
philosophers, and quite properly so. Even outside such areas, 
what one might call the defensive footnote has become a 
notable feature of analytic writings. (2008, p. 167)    
   
However, H.H Price in his seminal paper ‘Clarity is not 
Enough’ uses the term ‘analytic philosophy’ in 1945. He 
attacks the dogmatic process of clarity that any philosophical 
inquiry during the period gives immense importance. Even 
Rudolf Carnap also becomes agonized to see the basic 
orientation and the same style of thinking for the quest of 
clarity. The method of analysis takes a noteworthy position in 
analytic trend that we cannot evade anyhow.  Some prominent 
thinkers agree on the question concerning the process and 
method of analytic philosophy, and they consider that here 
reason, clarity, scientific spirit, evidence and experience should 
underpin the analysis of language. Thomas Kuhn, a believer of 
scientific holism, rejects the idea of piecemeal procedure of 
analysis. Kuhn believes that both the scientists and common 
persons find out the world as whole from the instability of 
experience. In the case of child learning, it often follows that 
by using a term like ‘mother,’ a child not only learns who is 
his/her mother, but concurrently learns to pursue a 
differentiation of male and female. Kuhn writes that ‘Paradigm 
determines large areas of experience at the same time.’ (1970, 
p. 129) Kuhn thinks that ‘paradigm’ is a sharable scientific 
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approach that is at the outset structured by community, not any 
way in isolation. The fashion tells us that language is neither 
empirical base nor a sociological event. Language belongs to 
the domain of scientific inquiry.  
 Hilary Putnam, a renaissance man of philosophy, clarifies 
that the vision of argumentative analysis of language is the core 
of analytic philosophy. Though semantic and logic pervades 
the conceptual analysis and logical analysis separately, yet we 
should open a genuine place for the scientific visions. In 
Putnam’s Internal Realism: A linguistic Sketch of World” 
(2016a, pp. 179-188) I remarked: 
In his ‘internal realism’, Putnam holds that reality has a 
human face because what is taken to be real is actually man-
made i.e. it is related to the human point of view. Dummett 
also suggests that truth is related to cognitive activities and it 
is coming into existence through practice of language. It 
seems to me that for Putnam beliefs and concepts are human 
creations and therefore they relate to the world that is given 
in human experience and Putnam retains what he calls 
internal realism, which guarantees that our concepts are 
objectively true of the world and so must be taken as the 
objective feature of our conceptual scheme. I think that 
Putnam rejects the external realism because it considers the 
world as something independent of human mind. 
 
The vast areas of analytic philosophy deploy different 
outlooks like linguistic, psychological, empirical, and scientific 
over the years. This line of thinking leads to safeguard 
language by setting a parameter of clarity in the notion of 
thought. Analytic philosophy tries to limit our human thought 
by concerning on the pyramid interrelation between language, 
thought and reality. Formal language philosophers like Russell, 
Frege, Carnap and logical positivists intend to construct an 
ideal language artificially. Such language will be free from any 
sort of unclarity, vagueness that assimilate in ordinary or 
natural language. An ideal language would be formal syntax 
and semantics based that nonetheless is derived from logical 
calculi. It also has one to one word and world corresponding 
logical vocabulary precisely guided by logical thoughts. 
Besides, the natural language is one that solely depends on 
grammar and social practices and has a productive and context 
based aspiration, which evades logical structure in the surface 
level of language that we call ‘depth-structure’. It is well 
proven that if we construct any formal language, then 
minimally the base and the surface level of the language is 
constructed by natural language. Ideal language presupposes 
natural language. Natural language is unconstructed that is 
certainly a part of the history of human race. I think that the 
conception of the artificial language or ideal language can be 
an extension of natural language. Natural language can be 
logically ideal. We can realize more improvingly the logical 
structure of the common language. Davidson, Putnam and 
Hintikka derive the formal logical systems with the help of our 
regimented language. Besides, linguist like Noam Chomsky 
invents that the idea of universal grammar and innate base 
language faculty is demonstrated from our natural language. 
Language, even in Wittgenstein’s sense, is a self-contained 
universal art, where everything that is described in words is 
imagined and included in language. However, Chomsky will 
suspect the mentioned aspect mainly because of his inclination 
towards ‘Thought precedes language’ hypothesis.    
 To precise the writing in a nutshell, I follow Dummett’s 
staking doctrine that looks the maturity of philosophy from the 
coherence of logic and philosophy of language. The milestone 
of analytic philosophy begins from 1960 onwards from a 
recede to the approach of scientism. Philosophy in the hand of 
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the analytic thinker becomes more humanistic endeavour rather 
than a snare of science.  I think that the boundary line that we 
portrayed between analytic philosophy and continental 
philosophy become too shaky from the level of geographical 
background and visions. A lot of thinker who migrated or 
converted from the continental region later extremely 
nourished the development of analytic philosophy in Anglo-
American regions like Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein and so on. 
Similarly, Charles Taylor, Hubert Dreyfus, Richard Rorty and 
Stanley Cavell are strongly inspired by continental thoughts 
and they make outstanding contributions in diversified areas. If 
we say that analysis, clarification, meaning and language are 
the founding pillars of analytic philosophy, and then we will 
see that continental philosophers like Gadamer, Husserl, 
Heidegger, Derrida, Isaiah Berlin, and Foucault have 
extensively worked in this realm. There are so many fields 
where analytic and continental philosophers exchange their 
thoughts and critique each other respectively. Some 
outstanding examples are as follows: Carnap’s critique of 
Heidegger’s The Nothing Nothings Hypothesis, Ryle’s 
approach on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Frege’s letters to 
Husserl, Chomsky-Foucault Debate on Justice and Human 
Nature, Searle’s and Derrida’s Debate on Austin’s Speech Act, 
Hilary Putnam and Habermas exchange of thoughts on the 
Fact/Value Dichotomy and so on. 
 There are many other examples that show the obsolete 
contrast between analytic and continental philosophy. There 
are so many interlinked areas where analytic and continental 
philosophers jointly and separately contributed, like in the 
areas of meaning, truth, intentionality, consciousness, mind-
world relation, etc. The analytic trend that has grown-up in the 
hands of Frege, Wittgenstein, and Carnap and the trend that we 
called analytic philosophy now are not on the same page. There 
occurred a devastating change in the methods and visions of 
the later analytic thinkers. Similar thing happened in 
continental philosophy. Germany, France and Italy now like to 
see their philosophical trends from their own nationalistic 
stances and happily segregated into different schools. French 
philosophy moves from existentialism to social-political 
philosophy and post-modernism, whereas German tradition 
tries to get away from the jargon of phenomenology and 
interest in social-political theory, psychoanalysis, 
hermeneutics, empirical philosophy, pragmatism etc. My query 
is that what makes analytic philosophy still promising. I think 
that no one can deny the two revolutionary turns that analytic 
philosophy takes, which is obviously the linguistic turn 
(analysis of language and thought) and the naturalistic turn 
(metaphilosophical, epistemological, ontological naturalism). 
These turns kept alive analytic philosophy in its distinctive 
domain. It seems to me that engaging with profound thoughts 
and intellectual exercises have no boundary line. Philosophers 
are flying bird who does not know the horizon of the sky, but 
knows how to think and fly. More philosophically, Hilary 
Putnam says, “Philosophy is not only concerned with changing 
our views, but also with changing our sensibility, our ability to 
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